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Abstract: Traditional US rental housing data sources such as the American Community 
Survey and the American Housing Survey report on the transacted market—what existing 
renters pay each month. They do not explicitly tell us about the spot market—i.e., the 
asking rents that current homeseekers must pay to acquire housing—though they are 
routinely used as a proxy. This study compares governmental data to millions of 
contemporaneous rental listings and finds that asking rents diverge substantially from these 
most recent estimates. Conventional housing data understate current market conditions 
and affordability challenges, especially in cities with tight and expensive rental markets.† 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
How much does it cost to rent a typical apartment in your city? Answering this basic housing 
question can be surprisingly difficult. Consider the case of San Francisco in early 2018, one 
of the US’s most expensive cities and a critical site for scholars and practitioners working on 
affordability, gentrification, residential mobility, and housing justice. According to the most 
recent (2016) American Community Survey (ACS), a typical two-bedroom unit in San 
Francisco rented for $2,017/month. We can compare this figure to the most recent (2015) 
American Housing Survey (AHS)—whose data are only available for the entire San Francisco 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA)—to find a median two-bedroom rent of $1,722. 
 In reality, anyone attempting to move to San Francisco or its suburbs in 2018 would 
have been hard-pressed to find a two-bedroom apartment on the market at these rent levels. 
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The US Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) contemporaneous Fair 
Market Rent (FMR)—published to determine Section 8 voucher payments to landlords—
was $3,121 for a 40th-percentile two-bedroom unit in San Francisco’s MSA. This figure 
comes closer to what someone moving to San Francisco may have had to pay but is still 
possibly too low. Data from Zillow (a for-profit company that aggregates rental listings) 
estimated that the median two-bedroom unit in the city of San Francisco rented for 
$4,197—double the ACS estimate (Reese 2018). 
  How might housing practitioners and scholars make sense of the drastic 
discrepancies between these estimates? These data sources obviously differ in recency due to 
varying publication lags, in geography as some cover the core city while others cover the 
entire MSA, and possibly in sampling biases or respondent errors. However, when 
considering how much it costs to rent a home, an equally important distinction exists 
between data that report rents for the transacted market (existing leases) and those that report 
on the spot market (current asking rents on the open market). That is, does the data product 
tell us what a typical existing renter pays each month, or rather what someone must pay if 
they currently seek housing? Transacted market data could diverge significantly from the 
spot market due to publication lags, market lags, subsidies, rent control, and length-of-stay 
discounts. 
Most readily-available sources of rents in US communities report data for the 
transacted market rather than the spot market. While such data sources are valuable, they do 
not tell us what someone currently must pay to acquire housing. This is a critical gap. 
According to the 2016 ACS, 37% of US renters reported having moved since the beginning 
of 2015. Yet much of this recent market activity remains illegible to scholars, planners, and 
advocates, inhibiting important research and policy development on pressing issues like the 
neighborhood-level effects of market-rate housing production on displacement, the impact of 
new transit stations on rental affordability, and the functioning of housing markets following 
natural disasters. In contrast, studies of owner-occupied housing do not suffer from this data 
shortage—price information in both transacted and spot markets is widely available. Yet 
rents are often more responsive than purchase prices to market trends and exogenous shocks. 
These information asymmetries constrain the questions that researchers can answer and even 
ask about housing markets. 
How well do readily-available rent estimates represent the rental spot market in 
different cities? This study analyzes Craigslist rental listings to investigate the legibility of 
asking rents and the inconsistent stories that existing data sources tell us about current 
affordability conditions in tight markets. We find that existing sources typically understate 
how expensive it is for people to relocate, with particular ramifications for intermetropolitan 
movers and voucher holders. First, we discuss currently-available rental data sources and their 
trade-offs, then summarize existing research on the economic implications of rapidly rising 
rents. Next, we describe our data sets and methods to analyze the discrepancies between 
existing data and the realities of the spot market. To do so, we compare the rental markets of 
25 MSAs using ACS, AHS, FMR, and Craigslist data. Finally, we discuss implications for 
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planners and suggest how online rental listings and other sources of spot market data could 
be made more widely available to close this critical information gap. 
2. The Rental Housing Data Landscape 
2.1. Rental Housing Affordability 
Few planning topics generate as much public concern today as rental housing. Recent 
decades have witnessed an across-the-board decline in rental affordability (Myers and Park 
2019), particularly for low-income renters (Chan and Jush 2017). This trend most famously 
impacts the US’s large coastal cities with robust economies and stiff housing supply 
constraints (Sassen 2001; Saiz 2010; Glaeser et al. 2005). But today, affordable housing for 
low-income renters—while never abundant—is growing scarcer even in less-expensive inland 
metropolitan areas with few natural or regulatory obstacles to development (Immergluck et 
al. 2017). 
 Metropolitan inversion—the revalorization of residential and commercial real estate 
in urban cores vis-à-vis outlying regions—is now occurring in almost all US urban areas 
following 75 years of centrifugal capital flows (Edlund et al. 2016). In areas where rentals 
have long constituted a larger share of the housing market—and where economic, cultural, 
and civic opportunities are growing—access to rental housing is dwindling for 
underprivileged families, even in otherwise affordable cities like Houston and Phoenix 
(Pfeiffer and Pearthree 2018). Accompanying this trend of declining rental affordability is a 
trend of declining home ownership. Citing mechanisms ranging from demographic shifts to 
persistent income inequality, three of the four forecasts in a recent Cityscape issue predict US 
homeownership rates in 2050 will fall from 2015’s 63% rate, which itself was already 
substantially down from the all-time high of 69% in 2004 (Acolin et al. 2016; Myers and 
Lee 2016; Nelson 2016; Haurin 2016). As rental housing becomes less affordable, it is 
simultaneously—and unsurprisingly—becoming more important. 
 Despite the critical significance of rental housing affordability, US data on rents are 
inconsistent and incomplete compared to those on owner-occupied housing. Researchers 
analyzing the latter have two primary information resources: property tax assessor data 
(roughly covering the transacted market) and multiple listing service (MLS) data (roughly 
covering the spot market). Neither serves every purpose perfectly. Property tax records are 
individually searchable online across the US, including in all populous urban and suburban 
counties, but in some cases tax assessors will not directly provide bulk data to researchers. In 
such instances, the data can be obtained for a fee from third-party commercial data 
aggregators. However, tax assessors use widely varying methodologies across counties and 
states that often diverge from pure market valuations (Martin and Beck 2018). Conversely, 
MLS data sometimes omit certain transactions or only include listed prices instead of 
consummated, transacted prices, which themselves are a matter of public record in most 
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states and available in online property tax records. These two data sources complement each 
other’s weaknesses and are essentially universally available. 
No equivalent of either data source exists for rents. Accordingly, most housing 
research relies on real estate prices, even when important research questions revolve around 
rents (e.g., Freemark 2019). For instance, studies examining whether new rail transit stations 
raise surrounding property values usually rely on single-family home prices simply because 
they are obtainable (e.g., Hess and Almeida 2007; Pan 2013; Cao and Lou 2018). However, 
rents are likely more responsive to transit proximity than single-family home prices are: 
rental housing tends to contain smaller and non-family households (both likelier to use 
transit) and rents can respond more rapidly to new local amenities than property sales can. 
The specter of rising rents displacing transit-dependent low-income families from station 
areas has alarmed social justice advocates and transportation planners seeking to increase 
transit ridership (Zuk et al. 2018). Yet real estate prices in station areas receive more research 
attention than rents because of disparities in spot market data availability and thus study 
tractability. 
2.2. Rental Housing Data Sources 
Table 1 summarizes the most common rental housing data sources and the trade-offs 
inherent in choosing between them. These sources fall into four categories. Those in the first, 
aggregated federal government sources, are the most widely known and used. They include the 
Census Bureau’s ACS and AHS as well as HUD’s FMR data. These data are aggregated: they 
summarize rents for groups of housing units within some geographical area. However, full 
distributions (rather than summary statistics) of rents would offer much more useful 
information. Although some distributions of rents can be obtained from the aggregated 
federal government sources, they are limited and often cannot be cross-tabulated with other 
useful variables (cf. Immergluck et al. 2017). 
The second category, disaggregated federal government sources, allows the researcher to 
analyze data from individual housing units. This includes the widely-available AHS 
microdata and the ACS’s Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS). However, to protect the 
privacy of survey respondents, their locations are abstracted to large geographical areas: 
respectively, MSAs of varying size and Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) of 
approximately 100,000 people each. Some researchers sidestep these limitations by acquiring 
permission from the Census Bureau to work directly with confidential individual data, but 
the process to obtain this “Special Sworn Status” is time-consuming and difficult. 
 The third category, local government administrative data, remains more noteworthy 
for its potential than for its widespread use. Local governments collect these administrative 
data to meet operational needs and supplement traditional sources, such as the census 
(Coulton 2008). Molfino et al. (2017) demonstrate the research value of administrative data 
as an ACS supplement, though they rely on tax assessor data and provide no information 
about rental housing. Researchers could potentially also use data from rent boards, local
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Table 1. Rental housing data sources and their characteristics. 
Category/Examples Owner Disagg? Spatial Coverage 
Temporal 
Coverage 
Spatial 
Resolution 
Temporal 
Resolution Market Segment Ease of Access 
Aggregated fed govt sources 
ACS data Federal govt No Nationwide Since 2005 or 2005-2009 
Census 
block group Annual All occupied housing Widely available 
AHS data Federal govt No Select MSAs Since 1973 MSA Every two years All occupied housing Widely available 
HUD FMR data Federal govt No Nationwide Since 1983 MSA or ZIP code Annual 
Recent movers 
(unsubsidized housing) Widely available 
Disaggregated fed govt sources 
ACS PUMS 
microdata Federal govt Yes Nationwide Since 2000 PUMA Annual All occupied housing Widely available 
AHS microdata Federal govt Yes Select MSAs Since 1973 MSA Every two years All occupied housing Widely available 
Confidential 
census data Federal govt Yes Nationwide 
Nearly 
unlimited 
Housing 
unit Annual All occupied housing Very difficult 
Local govt admin data 
Rent board 
admin data Local govts Yes 
Small number 
of cities Various 
Housing 
unit 
Quarterly 
(typical) 
Occupied housing on 
properties subject to 
local rent regulation 
Special permission 
or FOIA 
Proprietary sources 
Apartment owner 
survey data 
Private 
companies Yes/No Most MSAs Various 
Individual 
property Various 
Occupied housing on 
large, unsubsidized 
properties 
Aggregates widely 
reported; disagg 
for purchase 
Proprietary rental 
listing data 
Private 
companies Yes/No Nationwide Various 
Housing 
unit 
Continually 
updated 
Spot market 
(unsubsidized) 
Aggregates rarely 
reported; disagg 
unavailable 
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bodies charged with administering rent regulations in the small minority of US cities that 
have them. Autor et al. (2012) use local data to identify formerly rent-controlled properties, 
but not to assess rents themselves. To access these data, the researchers had to file a Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) request, a nontrivial process. 
The final category comprises proprietary sources. These have traditionally taken the 
form of surveys of apartment property owners (usually limited to some minimum size, e.g., 
50 units or more), conducted by market research firms. These firms typically make the 
resulting data sets available for purchase (at a high price) to researchers, although the news 
media are often given aggregated synopses. More recently, the rise of Internet-based 
platforms has allowed for-profit companies such as Zillow, RentJungle, Craigslist, and 
PadMapper to amass vast proprietary databases of rental listings (Boeing and Waddell 2017; 
Porter et al. 2019). Their data are tantalizingly rich, detailed, and rare in their ability to 
describe the spot market in disaggregate form, despite potential sampling biases such as 
correlations between sociodemographics and preferences to list/search for rental housing 
online (Boeing 2019). Yet these data remain under the control of private companies that 
only release information to researchers in limited circumstances. 
2.3. Advantages and Limitations of Spot Market Data 
If made widely available, data sets compiling public rental listings on proprietary web sites 
would provide an invaluable complement to the constellation of sources listed in Table 1, 
filling some of the critical spot market gaps that currently exist. Given the pressing need to 
understand current market conditions and asking rents, many scholars have started collecting 
samples of publicly-available online rental listings to analyze ad hoc (e.g., Mallach 2010; 
Halket and di Custoza 2015; Boeing and Waddell 2017; Brown et al. 2017; Im et al. 2017; 
Schachter and Besbris 2017; Palm 2018). 
Much like the governmental data sources, rental listings data have both strengths 
and weaknesses, as well as both consistencies and inconsistencies with the governmental data. 
Boeing and Waddell (2017) document these consistencies, including how Craigslist and 
HUD values correlate across MSAs, but caveat that Craigslist represents advertised rents, not 
final consummated transactions—an important limitation to remember. Boeing (2019) 
explores inconsistencies between Craigslist and ACS data, acknowledging the limitations of 
using ACS rent data but also quantifying Craigslist’s sampling biases: in some cities the 
online listings over-represent whiter, wealthier, and better-educated neighborhoods. In the 
constellation of imperfect information sources about the rental market, online listings like 
Craigslist offer the benefits of timeliness and unit characteristics, but have three key 
limitations: 1) they represent asking—not transacted—rents; 2) they exhibit some sampling 
biases; 3) they alone do not include demographic data of listers or renters. Nevertheless, spot 
market data reveal the information landscape and constraints faced by people seeking to 
change their housing circumstances at a given moment. 
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As illustrated by the introduction’s discussion of San Francisco, spot market rents 
could differ significantly from transacted rents for four primary reasons: publication lags, 
market lags, subsidies, and rent control. First, census and other survey data are gathered, 
compiled, and published with a lag of months or years. Rents and other facts on the ground 
can change drastically during this delay. Second, due to supply constraints, excess demand, 
length-of-stay discounts, or even just inflation, the present year’s rents could exceed those of 
past years’ leases. Because relocation imposes costs on tenants and landlords, economic 
theory (Galster 2019) and empirical evidence (Larsen and Sommervoll 2008) suggest that 
rents for tenants in the transacted market lag behind rents faced by those seeking housing on 
the spot market. Third, many tenants live in income-restricted dwellings, public housing, or 
units subsidized with Housing Choice Vouchers (HCV) and Low-Income Housing Tax 
Credits—substantially impacting the actual rent paid. Fourth and finally, in some high-rent 
cities—including San Francisco and some of its suburbs—rent control slows the rate at 
which rents rise for many households (Metcalf 2018). Particularly in such cities—which 
often anchor rental markets with the most extreme conditions of low vacancy and 
constrained supply—obtaining information about spot markets rather than rents paid in 
accordance with previously-transacted leases is critical for shedding light on vexing public 
policy problems. 
One such problem concerns the constraints faced by HCV holders moving within 
and between MSAs. Substantial evidence suggests that HCV holders, particularly those that 
are minorities, are disproportionately concentrated in low-opportunity neighborhoods 
despite the program’s intended goal of facilitating geographic mobility (Pendall 2000; Basolo 
and Nguyen 2005; Lens 2013). Recent research has illuminated the constrained housing 
search processes of HCV holders. For instance, landlords have approached would-be HCV 
holders—standing in line to collect their vouchers from the housing authority—to offer 
these carless prospective tenants rides to apartment showings in distressed neighborhoods 
(Rosen 2014). The extent to which Craigslist can make below-FMR and thus eligible units 
legible to HCV holders could help advance the original intent of the HCV program as a 
choice- and mobility-maximizing policy for low-income tenants (Newman and Schnare 
1997; Schwartz et al. 2017; Boeing 2019; Boeing et al. 2020). Spot market data could also 
help validate the all-important FMR levels or even improve their accuracy and timeliness. 
Another heavily-researched policy problem is the declining rate of long-distance 
mobility to high-wage MSAs (cf. Manduca 2019). Americans relocate at lower rates than 
they once did. From the 1950s to 2009, the proportion of households that changed 
residence dropped by 40%, with a steady decline since 1983 (Frey 2009). Reduced economic 
mobility bears broad consequences. Ganong and Shoag (2017) calculate that between 1980-
2010, per-capita incomes between US states converged at only half the rate they had over the 
prior 100 years. For most of the 20th century, Americans migrated from low-income to high-
income places, but in 1980 this trend began to reverse before turning sharply negative from 
2005-2010. Today, high housing costs in high-wage regions reduce economic mobility and 
thus overall economic growth. This threatens the entire economy as housing costs stifle labor 
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moving to where it is demanded. Herkenhoff et al. (2017) and Hsieh and Moretti (2019) 
attribute significant reductions in US GDP to this phenomenon. 
Studies such as Ganong and Shoag’s generally rely on home sale prices for the 
reasons enumerated earlier. But most movers seek rental housing: according to the 2016 
ACS, 71% of US households that had moved since the beginning of 2015 were renters. 
While people looking to relocate locally may in some cases utilize soft ties, personal 
knowledge, and in-person visits to scout suitable housing units, people relocating from out of 
town are more dependent on online information exchanges to search for housing remotely. 
Meanwhile, the stakes of an optimal rental housing search outcome, whether long-
distance or local, are increasing. Rent burdens (tenants’ rents as a share of their income) have 
risen across the board, even in moderate- and low-priced markets with high vacancy rates 
(Desmond 2018). This has in part precipitated a sharp uptick in evictions, with profound 
consequences for the stability of low-income families (Desmond and Perkins 2016; 
Desmond and Wilmers 2019). Desmond (2018) argues that research and policymaking have 
not caught up to these realities. Incomplete data on the housing market constraints faced by 
renters, especially HCV holders and low-income households facing frequent moves, are a key 
part of this problem. Rigorous analyses of intra- or inter-metropolitan residential mobility 
must consider both the home buying and rental spot markets, but our collective knowledge 
of the latter routinely relies on transacted-rents data as a weak proxy. 
3. Methods 
Given these problems—for both long-distance and within-metro moves, and particularly the 
most vulnerable lower-income renters and HCV holders—this study poses the question: to 
what extent do widely-available official estimates of rent misrepresent the contemporaneous 
rental spot market? We assess the limitations of existing rental data and the strengths and 
weaknesses of using spot market data such as online rental listings as a supplement. 
3.1. Data 
We analyze four data sources: 1) 2014 one-year ACS median contract rent estimates; 2) 
2015 AHS recent-mover median rent estimates for households that moved between 2010-
2015; 3) 2014 HUD FMRs; and 4) we adopt Boeing and Waddell’s (2017) data set of rental 
listings posted on Craigslist in 2014. Those authors detail how the Craigslist data were 
collected and processed, but we briefly summarize their methods here. They developed a web 
scraper that ran nightly between May and July 2014, collecting every US rental listing posted 
in the previous 24 hours. After these data were collected, they were processed and cleaned in 
several steps to produce a data set more appropriate for housing market analysis. Duplicate 
listings and reposts were removed and the rest were filtered to discard extreme outliers, 
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obvious spam, and typographical errors. This yields a final data set of 3 million listings which 
we adopt for our study. 
We use the ACS/AHS’s reported margins of error (MOE) to construct 90% 
confidence intervals (CI) around their sample-derived rent estimates in the 25 MSAs covered 
by the 2015 AHS. We also use ACS data to compute the economic rental vacancy rate (i.e., 
the share of rental housing units reported as currently available for rent). Finally, from AHS 
data, we calculate the subsidized/controlled share of units: i.e., either subsidized (public 
housing, voucher-subsidized, or privately-owned subsidized housing) or rent-controlled. The 
AHS is the only one of these aggregated federal government sources that allows for 
differentiation between rental units that are subsidized/controlled and those that are not. 
Unless otherwise stated, our reported AHS rents include all units regardless of subsidy or 
control. 
3.2. Analysis 
We measure the disparity between Craigslist asking rents and ACS rents reported for the 
corresponding MSA as the “ACS disparity,” δACS:  
 
𝛿ACS =  
Craigslist median rent
ACS median rent
− 1 (1) 
 
Next, we calculate the “AHS disparity,” δAHS, between Craigslist asking rents and 
AHS recent-mover rents for the corresponding MSA: 
 
𝛿AHS =  
Craigslist median rent
AHS recent-mover median rent
− 1 (2) 
 
Then we calculate a similar “FMR disparity,” δFMR, to quantify discrepancies 
between asking rents in the most widely-used rental housing information exchange and the 
official rent levels that govern HCV eligibility: 
 
𝛿FMR =  
Craigslist 𝑛୲୦ percentile rent
FMR at 𝑛୲୦ percentile
− 1 (3) 
 
In most markets, HUD calculates FMRs at the 40th percentile rent from ACS data 
(inflation-adjusted, lagged, and with a recent-mover adjustment) to offer HCV holders 
access to units of slightly below-typical quality, but HUD uses the 50th percentile instead in 
some MSAs, including the following in this study: Houston, Philadelphia, Phoenix, and 
Riverside. We calculate δFMR using the 40th or 50th percentile rent in each MSA’s Craigslist 
distribution, depending on which HUD uses there. HUD publishes FMRs by bedroom 
count, so we separately calculate δFMR for units in four categories (1, 2, 3, and 4+ bedrooms) 
within each MSA. Studio units are omitted from the analysis due to insufficient and 
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inconsistent data coverage, and we omit Dallas from this analysis because its FMRs were 
published by ZIP code rather than for the MSA. 
These three indicators (δACS, δAHS, and δFMR) elucidate how rent information derived 
from conventional governmental data sources over- or under-states contemporaneous asking 
rents and, particularly, the market reality faced by those searching for housing information 
online. 
4. Findings 
In 24 of the 25 MSAs studied, δACS is positive: the MSA’s typical asking rent exceeds the 
median rent reported by the ACS (see Table 2). Phoenix is the only exception. This finding 
conforms to expectations, given that long-term tenancy, rent control, and housing subsidies 
likely all hold transacted rents lower than spot market rents (to varying degrees across MSAs) 
during a period of economic growth. However, the roster of MSAs with an extreme disparity 
is noteworthy. In New York, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and Philadelphia—a group 
that includes three of the five highest-rent MSAs—the disparity is +63% or greater. In these 
hot markets, ACS estimates are particularly disconnected from asking rents. The ACS rent 
estimates’ MOEs are generally small: no MSA has an MOE exceeding $16 and they 
negligibly impact the interpretation of δACS. 
Contract rents provide the most relevant comparison to Craigslist asking rents, but 
the ACS only reports recent-mover rents for gross rents, which include utility costs. While 
this ACS limitation underscores the importance of alternative data sources like Craigslist, as a 
robustness check we additionally calculate an alternative, δACS′, using recent-mover gross 
rents (Appendix 1), and still find consistent disparities in some of the tightest rental markets 
even though it compares rents that include utilities (ACS) with rents that do not (Craigslist). 
This alternative indicator is unsurprisingly lower across the board than δACS, but both its 
mean and median are positive and its values remain high in expensive cities like New York 
and San Francisco. It also strongly correlates with δACS (Pearson’s r=0.99, p<0.01). Every data 
source is imperfect, but this robustness check underscores how Craigslist offers a 
complementary though imperfect spot market lens to the current constellation of flawed data 
sources. 
Table 3 summarizes δFMR by MSA and bedroom count. Its general pattern remains 
positive, though less so than for δACS. When δFMR is averaged across bedroom counts, it is 
positive in 15 of the 24 MSAs. We calculate a Pearson’s r of -0.48 (p<0.05) between δFMR 
(averaged across bedroom counts) and the MSAs’ economic rental vacancy rates. That is, the 
tighter the housing market, the more the asking rents exceed the HCV thresholds. These 
results suggest that where HCVs are most needed, their users’ ability to find rental units in 
which they can use them is most constrained—consistent with the theory that demand-side 
supplements function best when sufficient supply-side opportunities exist. 
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Table 4 summarizes the δAHS findings. In almost all cases, the entire 90% CI of the 
disparity between Craigslist rents and AHS recent-mover rents lies above zero. In other 
words, across most MSAs and bedroom types, median Craigslist rents consistently exceed 
recent-mover AHS rents even when accounting for sampling error in the latter. The only 
exceptions are 1-bedroom units in Phoenix, and 3 and 4+ bedroom units in Seattle. We can 
possibly attribute some of this disparity to the weak economy and low rents on offer at the 
beginning of the 2010-2015 period. But this alone cannot explain the full effect: in most 
cases the δAHS averaged across bedrooms (Table 4) exceeds the ACS-reported contract rent 
growth from the equivalent period, particularly in the MSAs with the greatest overall 
disparities, such as New York and San Francisco. Sampling biases could also exist: if 
Craigslist over-represents more-expensive units or neighborhoods, we might see higher 
median asking rents than actually occur across the full market. 
Table 5 shows how several variables, including median ACS and AHS rents, 
correlate across the MSAs. As we might expect, in most MSAs, δACS is greater than δAHS but 
they strongly correlate. One might hypothesize that both disparities would be higher in 
MSAs with high recent rent growth as tenant competition boosts the asking rents of 
 
Table 2. ACS disparity for the 25 MSAs (with MOE) 
MSA δACS 
Atlanta 6% ± 1% 
Boston 114% ± 2% 
Chicago 78% ± 1% 
Cincinnati 22% ± 1% 
Cleveland 24% ± 1% 
Dallas 40% ± 1% 
Denver 30% ± 1% 
Detroit 16% ± 1% 
Houston 24% ± 1% 
Kansas City 12% ± 2% 
Los Angeles 52% ± 1% 
Memphis 25% ± 3% 
Miami 53% ± 2% 
Milwaukee 28% ± 1% 
New Orleans 32% ± 3% 
New York City 120% ± 1% 
Philadelphia 67% ± 1% 
Phoenix -1% ± 1% 
Pittsburgh 54% ± 2% 
Portland 26% ± 1% 
Raleigh 14% ± 2% 
Riverside 27% ± 2% 
San Francisco 63% ± 2% 
Seattle 25% ± 2% 
Washington 21% ± 1% 
Mean 39% 
Median  27% 
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Table 3. FMR rent disparity, by number of bedrooms, for the 25 MSAs 
Region δFMR (1 BR) δFMR (2 BR) δFMR (3 BR) δFMR (4+ BR) δFMR (avg) Economic rental vacancy rate 
Atlanta -6% -15% -28% -27% -19% 8.4% 
Boston 59% 46% 44% 65% 53% 3.3% 
Chicago 39% 42% 26% 41% 37% 6.3% 
Cincinnati 0% -2% -12% 7% -2% 6.3% 
Cleveland 1% -5% -13% -4% -5% 6.6% 
Dallas - - - - - 7.0% 
Denver 32% 29% 11% 16% 22% 4.0% 
Detroit -7% -11% -24% -10% -13% 6.2% 
Houston 24% 3% -11% -1% 4% 7.1% 
Kansas City -13% -17% -32% -23% -21% 7.5% 
Los Angeles 34% 29% -5% -11% 12% 3.3% 
Memphis -7% -16% -24% -20% -17% 10.6% 
Miami 32% 20% 3% 18% 18% 7.0% 
Milwaukee 7% 3% 1% 7% 5% 3.7% 
New Orleans -2% -5% -8% -3% -4% 8.7% 
New York 52% 60% 57% 78% 62% 4.2% 
Philadelphia 42% 41% 6% 19% 27% 7.1% 
Phoenix -16% -17% -22% -21% -19% 7.7% 
Pittsburgh 18% 11% 0% -5% 6% 5.0% 
Portland 18% 10% -2% 10% 9% 2.2% 
Raleigh 5% 0% -3% -2% 0% 6.2% 
Riverside 17% 13% -4% -7% 5% 6.4% 
San Francisco 23% 17% 3% -7% 9% 2.7% 
Seattle 16% -2% -16% -15% -4% 3.2% 
Washington 16% 12% -6% -11% 3% 5.2% 
Mean 16% 10% -3% 4% 7% 5.8% 
Median 17% 7% -4% -3% 4% 6.3% 
Note: economic vacancy rate is the percentage of all rental units that are currently available for rent (per ACS). Does not include 
units that are rented but unoccupied. Results for Dallas are not reported because FMRs are reported at the ZIP code level there. 
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Table 4. AHS recent-mover disparity (with MOE), by number of bedrooms, for the 25 MSAs 
Region 
δAHS  
(1 BR) 
δAHS 
 (2 BRs) 
δAHS  
(3 BRs) 
δAHS  
(4+ BRs) 
δAHS 
(avg by BR type) 
ACS rent 
increase 2010-15 
Subsidized/ 
controlled 
Atlanta 9% ± 6% 3% ± 3% 0% ± 1% 5% ± 15% 4% 11% 8% 
Boston 94% ± 26% 86% ± 11% 104% ± 30% 58% ± 22% 86% 12% 18% 
Chicago 59% ± 17% 72% ± 3% 63% ± 24% 103% ± 49% 74% 10% 12% 
Cincinnati 20% ± 3% 9% ± 6% 17% ± 11% 61% ± 24% 27% 10% 14% 
Cleveland 16% ± 7% 19% ± 4% 26% ± 7% 40% ± 17% 25% 6% 15% 
Dallas 32% ± 5% 66% ± 5% 33% ± 13% 20% ± 7% 38% 17% 6% 
Denver 12% ± 9% 25% ± 9% 23% ± 8% 26% ± 9% 21% 27% 8% 
Detroit 4% ± 3% 9% ± 6% 13% ± 12% 50% ± 12% 19% 9% 12% 
Houston 33% ± 6% 19% ± 3% 20% ± 12% 12% ± 12% 21% 16% 5% 
Kansas City 0% ± 7% 8% ± 5% 14% ± 9% 33% ± 15% 14% 11% 11% 
Los Angeles 46% ±11% 33% ± 2% 21% ± 10% 30% ± 25% 33% 11% 17% 
Memphis 19% ± 6% 21% ± 9% 29% ± 6% 24% ± 22% 23% 9% 10% 
Miami 53% ±7% 37% ± 6% 20% ± 11% 48% ± 18% 39% 13% 8% 
Milwaukee 13% ±5% 21% ± 4% 36% ± 8% 58% ± 19% 32% 9% 10% 
New Orleans 18% ±11% 24% ± 8% 34% ± 11% 51% ± 30% 32% 6% 18% 
New York 76% ±11% 101% ± 18% 103% ± 26% 199% ± 119% 120% 13% 26% 
Philadelphia 58% ± 13% 61% ± 10% 52% ± 18% 41% ± 26% 53% 10% 13% 
Phoenix -1% ± 5% 0% ± 2% 14% ± 7% 19% ± 7% 8% 11% 4% 
Pittsburgh 43% ± 18% 38% ± 11% 75% ± 19% 85% ± 86% 60% 15% 16% 
Portland 13% ± 5% 17% ± 4% 14% ± 8% 40% ± 14% 21% 19% 8% 
Raleigh 1% ± 2% 6% ± 3% 27% ± 4% 12% ± 10% 12% 16% 6% 
Riverside 39% ± 11% 27% ± 6% 28% ± 8% 22% ± 14% 29% 7% 6% 
San Francisco 30% ± 11% 38% ± 12% 52% ± 17% 63% ± 16% 46% 20% 31% 
Seattle 22% ± 7% 13% ± 5% -1% ± 4% -4% ± 8% 8% 20% 8% 
Washington 20% ± 7% 25% ± 3% 26% ± 12% 38% ± 12% 27% 14% 13% 
Mean 29% 31% 34% 45% 35% 13% 12% 
Median 20% 24% 26% 40% 27% 11% 11% 
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Table 5. Correlation matrix of indicators across all 25 MSAs 
  δACS δFMR δAHS 
ACS median 
contract 
rent, 2014 
Inter-quartile range of 
AHS contract rent, 
non-HUD units, 2015 
ACS rent change 
2010-15 
Subsidized/ 
controlled 
Economic 
rental 
vacancy rate 
δFMR 0.92***        
δAHS 0.98*** 0.90***       
ACS median contract 
rent, 2014 0.44*** 0.47** 0.35      
Interquartile range of 
AHS contract rent, 
non-HUD units, 2015 0.57*** 0.55*** 0.48** 0.89***     
ACS rent change 
2010-15 0.05 0.07 -0.12 0.37* 0.44**    
Pct 
subsidized/controlled 0.63*** 0.43** 0.57*** 0.45** 0.52*** -0.01   
Economic rental 
vacancy rate -0.38* -0.48** -0.26 -0.56*** -0.61*** -0.63*** -0.36*  
Pct movers from 
outside county 0.11 0.21 0.01 0.39* 0.43** 0.62*** 0.17 -0.33 
Note: δFMR averaged across all bedroom types. Significance noted as *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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increasingly scarce units. However, the correlations between rent growth from 2010-2015 
and the disparity indicators are insignificant: the extent to which current census estimates 
understate asking rents tends to be unrelated to the rate at which metropolitan rents are 
rising. 
MSAs with little subsidized/controlled housing (e.g., Denver, Seattle, and Portland) 
experienced the highest rent growth rates between 2010-2015. Conversely, some of the 
MSAs with the most subsidized/controlled housing experienced middling rent growth (e.g., 
Boston, New York, and Los Angeles; San Francisco is an exception). In the former, a greater 
proportion of existing tenants would have faced rent increases upon lease renewal than in the 
latter. This finding suggests that disparity magnitudes may be driven more by the presence of 
rent-restricted housing than by cyclical “hotness” (or lack thereof) in the market. In other 
words, census data most understate asking rents in MSAs with the most 
subsidized/controlled housing—the same places where housing markets are tightest, overall 
rents highest (per the correlation between ACS rent and δACS), vacancy rates lowest, and new 
housing supply most constrained. 
An MSA’s share of subsidized/controlled rental stock correlates significantly and 
moderately strongly with δACS (r=0.63, p<0.01), δFMR (r=0.43, p<0.05), and δAHS (r=0.57, 
p<0.01). This makes sense theoretically. In both tight and soft housing markets, long waiting 
lists exist for newly available subsidized units and their landlords face little obstacle finding 
enough tenants to fill vacancies. Their primary concern instead may be protecting themselves 
from Fair Housing Act liability by advertising available units in traditional media that target 
vulnerable populations who have historically experienced discrimination (i.e., not Craigslist). 
Thus, if Craigslist listings comprise mostly unsubsidized rental units, these findings suggest 
that the more controlled units that exist within an MSA, the more the conventional rent data 
(ACS and AHS) will understate current market-rate asking rents. Moreover, if transacted-
rents data include rent-controlled units held below market rates, we would similarly expect 
asking rents on the market to be higher. 
5. Discussion 
Most governmental and proprietary data on rents report the prevailing terms of transacted 
leases. This information helps planners and policymakers assess affordability, calculate 
FMRs, and understand what existing renters pay in relation to local income and other 
socioeconomic traits. However, these data do not describe the spot market in which 
prospective renters and landlords produce an evolving equilibrium of new rents. Asking rents 
could diverge substantially from data reporting transacted rents due to publication lags, 
market lags, subsidies, and rent control. Rent data describing the full transacted market 
would particularly fail to describe current market conditions in locations with rapidly rising 
rents or large shares of rent-controlled units. Yet it is these very cities and neighborhoods that 
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often most concern housing scholars, practitioners, and advocates of housing justice and 
inclusivity. 
This returns us to our original question: how well do widely-available rental data 
sources describe the spot market? We find that in most MSAs—and particularly those with 
booming job markets and constrained housing production—asking rents substantially exceed 
ACS, FMR, and AHS estimates. However, these findings could partly represent sampling 
biases: if Craigslist over-represents high-rent neighborhoods and rental units, we would 
expect its typical asking rents to exceed more-representative estimates. However, Craigslist 
does not exclusively represent the high-end rental market: about half of its listings’ asking 
rents would be affordable for households just below the US median income and about a 
quarter would be affordable for households just below the corresponding median for African-
American households (Boeing 2019). Craigslist hosts millions of rental listings each month, 
many of which are within the reach of low- and moderate-income families. 
Online information exchanges have important ramifications for two groups in 
particular that deserve further research. First, households using HCVs to relocate to higher-
opportunity neighborhoods would benefit from Craigslist’s broadcasting of information if it 
could help them find HCV-eligible units in unfamiliar neighborhoods. Online information 
exchanges thus play a potentially crucial role in ongoing residential sorting and segregation 
(Krysan and Crowder 2017; Boeing et al. 2020). Their data exhaust could also help 
policymakers set FMRs to better reflect current market conditions. Planners working in hot 
markets might use Craigslist data (instead of conducting expensive, time-consuming surveys 
by hand) to petition HUD for higher FMRs—for instance, by requesting that HUD use the 
50th percentile standard, rather than the typical 40th, as has happened in several MSAs. HUD 
itself could even incorporate spot market data sources such as Craigslist into its FMR 
calculations—especially considering how these online platforms’ information-broadcasting 
benefits could help make choice neighborhoods’ affordable units more legible to 
disadvantaged homeseekers searching by unit characteristics to overcome their own locally-
constrained market knowledge (Boeing et al. 2020). 
Second, while people looking to relocate locally may have the option to utilize soft 
ties, tacit regional knowledge, and in-person scouting trips to identify suitable housing units, 
people looking to relocate from out of town depend much more on online information 
exchanges and rental listings to conduct housing searches. They thus play an understudied 
role in inter-metropolitan residential and economic mobility. On average across these MSAs, 
62% of movers remained in the same county, but 20% of movers were from out of state or 
abroad. In cities like Boston, Washington, Portland, and Seattle, over 25% of movers were 
from different states or abroad (details in Appendix 2). This underscores the importance of 
online information exchanges for out-of-town movers in many markets. 
In sum, this study’s findings question planners’ current ability to assess affordability 
barriers to residential mobility when conventional data sources substantially understate 
current rental market conditions. Online listings data can provide valuable insights into 
rapidly-evolving rental housing markets that widely-available governmental sources cannot. 
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However, like other data sources, Craigslist data offer both advantages and limitations. On 
one hand, they are timelier, include unit characteristics, and represent small-area rental 
markets searched by current homeseekers. On the other hand, they do not represent final 
transacted rents and do exhibit some sampling biases. However, online listings data do 
faithfully represent the online housing market, and, according to the most recent AHS, more 
renters in urbanized areas found their current homes through online listing sites like 
Craigslist than through any other information source. Planners must weigh these trade-offs 
when considering data sources to understand rental markets from multiple perspectives. A 
publicly available spot market data source could supplement the current constellation of data 
sources and narrow the information gap between owner-occupied and rental housing and 
between transacted rents and asking rents. This is critical given the ascending importance of 
the US rental market alongside dwindling affordability and economic mobility. 
 How can researchers and practitioners gain broader access to online rental listings 
data? Several different paths forward are possible. Ideally, the Census Bureau would partner 
with online listing sites such as Craigslist, Zillow, and RentJungle. Rental listings could then 
underlie a constantly updated spot market data product with the federal government’s 
imprimatur of legitimacy and accuracy. As with all other census data, various steps would 
need to be taken to appropriately safeguard anonymity and privacy. Ideally, however, listings 
would be made available in disaggregate form with due protections, as is currently the case 
with PUMS and AHS microdata. Other possibilities also exist. A consortium of university-
based research centers might collaborate with online listing sites to routinely acquire rental 
listings, compile them, and operate a data clearinghouse. Regardless of the exact model, a 
rich set of spot market data must be widely and publicly available for researchers and 
practitioners to address today’s most pressing rental housing questions. 
6. Conclusion 
This study analyzed millions of Craigslist rental listings to investigate how asking rents on 
the spot market deviate from current governmental data sources. The ACS, AHS, and FMR 
are the federal government’s three most widely-used aggregated data sources on rents and 
each has its own strengths and limitations. By looking across all three of them, we found that 
these conventional data sources on which planners rely typically understate contemporaneous 
asking rents in most MSAs. Craigslist listings (and related spot market data sources) can serve 
as a useful though imperfect complement to today’s constellation of imperfect rental market 
data. Each piece of this constellation has its own unique flaws, but in concert they provide a 
richer nuanced view of the market from different perspectives and with different trade-offs. 
This is important for planners in three key ways. First, these technology platforms 
are rapidly changing the housing market (cf. Fields and Rogers 2019; Porter et al. 2019) and 
their data exhaust offers planners a new lens to understand market behavior in what has 
become the dominant housing information exchange. Second, spot market data provide a 
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particularly useful complement to transacted data in markets with rapidly rising rents, due to 
the importance of timeliness for planners and policymakers trying to understand local 
affordability and craft housing interventions. Third, HCV holders and inter-metropolitan 
movers in particular could benefit from online information exchanges (in very different 
ways) that must be considered by policymakers and practitioners as well as scholars of 
residential and economic mobility. 
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Appendix 1. ACS recent-mover gross rent disparity for the 25 MSAs (with MOE). 
MSA 
Recent-mover gross 
rent ACS disparity 
Atlanta -15.4% ± 0.9% 
Boston 74.2% ± 2.4% 
Chicago 46.8% ± 1.5% 
Cincinnati -2.2% ± 1.5% 
Cleveland 0.9% ± 1.4% 
Dallas 14.3% ± 1.0% 
Denver 11.4% ± 1.5% 
Detroit -9.3% ± 1.0% 
Houston 0.5% ± 0.9% 
Kansas City -14.2% ± 1.3% 
Los Angeles 29.9% ± 0.7% 
Memphis -8.3% ± 1.8% 
Miami 31.0% ± 1.2% 
Milwaukee 5.4% ± 1.2% 
New Orleans 9.2% ± 1.8% 
New York City 78.4% ± 1.2% 
Philadelphia 34.5% ± 1.4% 
Phoenix -17.6% ± 1.1% 
Pittsburgh 17.8% ± 1.8% 
Portland 5.4% ± 1.6% 
Raleigh -7.1% ± 2.1% 
Riverside 7.1% ± 1.3% 
San Francisco 40.4% ± 1.8% 
Seattle 5.2% ± 1.1% 
Washington 5.4% ± 1.0% 
Mean 13.7% 
Median  5.4% 
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Appendix 2. ACS movers’ origins for the 25 MSAs. 
MSA 
Local (Same  
County) Mover 
Non-Local  
Same-State Mover 
Out of State or  
Abroad Mover 
Atlanta 49% 30% 21% 
Boston 52% 20% 28% 
Chicago 69% 12% 18% 
Cincinnati 64% 18% 18% 
Cleveland 76% 12% 12% 
Dallas 62% 21% 17% 
Denver 44% 32% 24% 
Detroit 67% 20% 13% 
Houston 65% 16% 20% 
Kansas City 60% 16% 24% 
Los Angeles 76% 10% 15% 
Memphis 74% 7% 19% 
Miami 71% 10% 19% 
Milwaukee 70% 17% 13% 
New Orleans 59% 21% 20% 
New York City 60% 17% 24% 
Philadelphia 58% 17% 24% 
Phoenix 71% 7% 22% 
Pittsburgh 62% 17% 20% 
Portland 54% 20% 27% 
Raleigh 61% 18% 22% 
Riverside 67% 22% 10% 
San Francisco 51% 27% 22% 
Seattle 61% 13% 26% 
Washington 50% 16% 34% 
Mean 62.1% 17.4% 20.5% 
Median  62.0% 18.0% 20.0% 
 
